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Abstract 
WikiLeaks has become a global phenomenon, and its founder and spokesman Julian Assange an international 
celebrity (or terrorist, depending on one's perspective). But perhaps this focus on Assange and his Website is 
as misplaced as the attacks against Napster and its founders were a decade ago: WikiLeaks itself only marks a 
new phase in a continuing shift in the balance of power between states and citizens, much as Napster helped 
undermine the control of major music labels over their industry. If the history of music filesharing is any guide, 
no level of punitive action against WikiLeaks and its supporters is going to re-contain the information it has set 
loose. 
Introduction: ‘What’s a Napster?’ 
One of the more interesting side stories in the recent movie The Social Network dealt with the role that 
Napster co-founder Sean Parker played in helping turn Facebook from an interesting start-up into the global 
behemoth which it has now become. Parker’s prominence in the final act of the movie, helped by the star 
power infused by former teen idol Justin Timberlake, may have been an exaggeration of the historical facts, 
but the overall story of helpful advice from one flamboyant entrepreneur to another remains believable. And 
yet, The Social Network’s audience might be forgiven for asking ‘what’s a Napster?’ as they left the cinema: 
while (like Google before it) Facebook has continued on its seemingly unstoppable trajectory, amassing a 
userbase that numbers more people than most countries in the word, Napster crashed and burned, and Parker 
retreated again to the relative obscurity of the behind-the-scenes angel investor. 
At the same time, what Napster (and Parker) started is certainly still with us – filesharing and downloading 
of music, movies, and other audiovisual materials through legal and illegal means from iTunes through Spotify 
to The Pirate Bay is now so commonplace a practice that any sensible person (which notably excludes the 
hard-heads in charge of RIAA and MPAA, and the U.S. lawmakers they sponsor) has long given up on 
prosecuting users. The genie is out of the bottle, and no amount of hush-hush copyright term extensions, 
draconian three-strikes laws, or unintentionally comical anti-piracy advertising is likely to coax it back inside. 
Most musicians, and those in the music industry whose core business remains promoting new music rather 
than exploiting existing content archives and executing mergers and acquisitions, have made their 
arrangements with this fact, and are beginning to find new approaches to their business. 
The Napster case – and its treatment in the media – has clear parallels with the current furore over 
WikiLeaks. The reduction of public discussion to WikiLeaks the Website, to charismatic founder Julian Assange, 
and to the controversies in his private life, not only provides a predictably sad and sadly predictable indictment 
on our mainstream media’s obsession with reducing complex narratives to simplistic personality stories, and 
with foregrounding gossip over substance; in doing so, the debate also misses altogether the longer-term 
dynamic of the WikiLeaks affair. What is necessary instead is a broader, longer-term view of these 
developments, and some informed speculation about where they may lead us. 
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From Whistleblowing to WikiLeaks 
Let us begin this exercise by taking a much wider perspective, then. Whistleblowing, and whistleblowers, 
existed well before WikiLeaks, just as music files were shared, slowly and with great difficulty, before Napster 
came on the scene – indeed, audio files circulated even before the invention of the MP3 audio compression 
format which made long-form music so much more easily transmissible online. For their chosen domains, what 
Napster and WikiLeaks did was simply to provide a much more straightforward and reliable platform for the 
exchange of information: before Napster, music enthusiasts may have shared music files, cut into acceptably-
sized pieces, through Usenet newsgroups or ftp servers which required both specific access privileges and 
great patience in retrieving the right material in a usable format; before WikiLeaks, leaking sensitive materials 
meant that whistleblowers had to take great personal risks in contacting potentially interested journalists with 
their material, and had to hope that those stories would indeed eventually see the light of day. 
In their turn, both platforms did much to utilise the affordances of Internet technologies to simplify these 
processes considerably. Napster’s major contribution was to disconnect the directory of available content from 
its place of storage: users of the Napster application connected to the central directory to announce the 
content available for download from their own machines, and to access the aggregate index of all files 
currently being shared by someone in the network – while Napster was still culpable for enabling the 
unauthorised dissemination of copyrighted audiovisual content, therefore, it was no longer involved in 
handling these materials directly. Legal or not, Napster simply became, for a while, the great crowdsourced 
index of everybody’s music collection, facilitating full access to everything it contained. In the process, it 
became ever more possible for both senders and receivers of music files on the network to gain safety in 
numbers and hide in the crowd: identifying the individual person who shared that specific Justin Timberlake 
track became much more difficult, and suing that one person while thousands of others were doing exactly the 
same became, if nothing else, patently unjust. 
WikiLeaks similarly transformed the process of whistleblowing, of leaking information, from a largely one-
on-one affair which took place behind closed doors, outside of public view, to one that takes place in public, 
yet anonymously, involving unknown parties and relying on WikiLeaks the platform and WikiLeaks the 
organisation as facilitator. By its own rhetoric, WikiLeaks provides a (supposedly) anonymous and secure 
platform enabling anyone with sensitive information which may be of relevance and interest of the wider 
public to come forward and share those materials, as well as acting as a means of making this information 
available to the general public and interested journalists and media organisations. To the extent that such 
claims are correct, then, WikiLeaks provides information exchange facilitation services for sensitive 
information which are similar to those which Napster provided for music. 
At the same time, WikiLeaks never quite managed to live up to its own high ambitions, of course; there are 
clear differences between the sharing of music files between fans and the sharing of sometimes complex and 
specialist information whose meaning and import is not always immediately accessible to the general public. 
To ensure maximum impact for the material leaked through the WikiLeaks site, the WikiLeaks organisation was 
essentially forced to partner with major media organisations around the world; additionally, WikiLeaks 
administrators chose to pursue a comparatively conventional public relations strategy of planning a slow but 
steady release of juicy tidbits from its major archives – most centrally, the U.S. diplomatic cables which have 
been gradually made available since February 2010 –, not least also in order to keep WikiLeaks itself in the 
news. While such interference with the overall share-anonymously-and-release-publicly process on which 
WikiLeaks was built might make sense from the point of view of media strategy, it also appears to counteract 
the overall ethos of the site (it replaces one information gatekeeper with another); it highlights the role and 
influence of WikiLeaks’ administrators; and it positions the WikiLeaks platform itself as a central point of 
potential failure. 
Notably, Napster suffered considerably at least from the third of these shortcomings, too. While Napster 
and its staff rarely interfered with the sharing of music files itself (much to the chagrin of copyright holders), its 
technological structure, too, was such that taking out Napster itself became the central most effective means 
of undermining the filesharing activities conducted through the site. While music files themselves remained on 
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the hard drives of participating users, and were shared across the network directly from there, the Napster 
directory existed only on its central server, and was queried there by its users; without access to the directory, 
therefore, sharing would be impossible. As a result, to gain control of Napster itself in order to shut down 
these central directory services soon became the core objective of music industry lawsuits; these finally led to 
its shut-down in 2001, and to its subsequent acquisition by music industry interests (who have spent the past 
decade attempting to revive the brand, without any measurable success). 
To date, WikiLeaks has managed to avoid a comparable fate by developing an organisational and 
technological structure that does not present a single point of failure anywhere in the system. The WikiLeaks 
site is distributed across multiple servers in several countries (some of them, if the organisation’s rhetoric is to 
be believed, in undisclosed and highly protected locations), with additional mirror sites run by various 
volunteers and other supporters; even the WikiLeaks organisation, centred as it may be around the 
controversial figure of Julian Assange, appears to be able to get by relatively unaffected by Assange’s house 
arrest and extradition proceedings.  
In this respect, WikiLeaks has learnt its lessons from Napster and other disruptive platforms and 
technologies. What followed Napster, after all, was not a terminal decline of online filesharing activities, as 
copyright industry executives might have wished, but rather the flowering of a wide range of platforms and 
technologies for disseminating music, movies, software, and any other content which could be made available 
in digital formats. Some of these remained relatively close to the Napster model, providing more or less central 
content directory services but simply remaining further underground and out of sight of copyright holders 
liable to sue them; some, on the other hand, developed more advanced technological solutions – such as 
Bittorrent – which made it possible to decentralise the content directories along with the content itself. As a 
result, for better or for worse, today’s advanced torrent-based filesharing activities are now almost impossible 
to trace effectively, and even harder to shut down; occasional legal proceedings such as the lawsuit against the 
Swedish site Pirate Bay and its operators do nothing to undermine or discourage filesharing as such, and only 
serve to highlight the impotence of copyright industries.  
Similarly, recent attempts to shut down individual WikiLeaks servers have done nothing to keep the site 
itself from being readily accessible, and other attempts to undermine its operations (Amazon’s eviction of 
WikiLeaks mirrors from its Web Services hosting service, or PayPal’s refusal to handle donations to WikiLeaks) 
amount to mere irritations, and also resulted in considerable public backlash against these companies. 
Similarly, actions against Assange and other WikiLeaks representatives, or against those revealed to have 
shared sensitive information through the platform, appear unlikely to fundamentally stifle the operations of 
the site: much as lawsuits for exorbitant damages against individual filesharers have, if anything, only added a 
political dimension to existing personal and practical motivations for music filesharing, so should it be 
expected that those politicians who now cry ‘treason’ over the U.S. cables and other leaked information only 
manage to harden the resolve of those who believe that more so-called state secrets must be revealed to 
safeguard democracy. Whistleblowing has always been an activity driven by higher ideals (however 
misunderstood these may have been in specific cases), and is often undertaken at great personal risk anyway – 
no amount of threatened punishment has ever managed to curb it entirely. Indeed, we may be justified to 
state the following maxim: the more extreme the political class’s reaction to WikiLeaks, the more necessary its 
existence in that country. 
Whistleblowing beyond WikiLeaks 
But for its considerable successes, both in facilitating the leaking of sensitive information and in capturing 
public attention for its cause, WikiLeaks is no Bittorrent, no particularly advanced socio-technological system 
for the secure sharing of leaked information: at its core, indeed, it remains – in spite of the trendy but 
misleading ‘wiki’ in its name – a remarkably Web 1.0 operation. WikiLeaks draws on volunteers for much of 
what it does, but not by embracing crowdsourcing or produsage processes to any significant extent; as far as 
any outsider can tell, it remains organised around a central hierarchy of staff led by Julian Assange himself. 
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(Indeed, recent controversies between Assange and some of WikiLeaks’ core staff and supporters, which 
appear to have led to the exodus of several key personnel, are only likely to have heightened the central role 
of Assange in the organisation.) WikiLeaks certainly isn’t Wikipedia, where founder Jimmy Wales is still revered 
for his role in the organisation, and reserves certain powers over the site, but has very little influence over 
what happens on a day-to-day basis across the massive knowledge repository that is continually created and 
revised by a vast and diverse Wikipedia userbase around the world. 
Similarly, while the WikiLeaks platform has been mirrored and thus multiplied in various places, it remains 
a relatively conventional Website; it has not followed the Bittorrent route of decentralising its operations to 
such an extent that its contents now exist in a torrented form (or are otherwise distributed in a highly diffused 
format). Following this route would safeguard both WikiLeaks’ contributors (by making their actions much 
more untraceable than they may presently be), and its own operations (by removing the final major point of 
failure in the WikiLeaks model: the Website and its mirrors as content repositories), but may also work against 
what appears to have become a more and more important raison d’être for the site: its ability to influence 
global public debate. It is this question which appears to be most central to deciding WikiLeaks’ future 
trajectory, indeed: does it aim simply to provide a safe and secure platform for the anonymous leaking of 
sensitive materials, as per its original mission, or does it seek to become a major media player affecting global 
politics, represented (in the main) by Julian Assange? 
WikiLeaks’ recent activities appear to point more strongly in the second direction. The site’s much-
publicised ‘preferential leaking’ relationship with major international news organisations from The Guardian to 
Der Spiegel was clearly designed to maximise the impact its leaks could have on global political news, and 
contributed considerably to the controversies (and in some readings, personality cult) around Assange himself. 
At the risk of providing simplistic psychoanalysis from a distance, WikiLeaks’ (or perhaps, more specifically, 
Assange’s) just as public falling-out with these partners, ostensibly over the handling of the leaked materials, 
also appeared to reveal a certain personal disappointment over the degree to which these activities had truly 
managed to capture and hold public attention around the world; the original underlying aim of providing 
greater transparency on public and private misdeeds in the world appeared to fall behind the desire simply to 
remain visible at all costs, through ever more extraordinary (and risky) releases of information. If confirmed, 
recent allegations that Assange knowingly released material without taking due precautions to protect the 
anonymity of informants and innocent third parties named in these documents, paint a very disturbing picture 
of the attitude now developing at the heart of the WikiLeaks operation. 
An alternative route would see WikiLeaks focus simply on becoming the most secure and reliable 
clearinghouse for leaked information that technological and organisational structures can provide, without 
focussing inherently on the need to publicise the information shared through the site; this would operate in 
the hope that (by now) journalists and interested citizens will already be aware enough of the site to look out 
for new materials being released through it, without needing mainstream media prompting. It would return to 
releasing all leaked material directly (after precautions to protect the innocent have been taken), rather than 
employing staged partial release strategies, and would cease playing favourites with selected news 
organisations. Such a WikiLeaks platform would be likely to embrace further non-Web technologies – for 
example, Bittorrent or similar decentralised networks – for the dissemination of its contents, and would use its 
multiply mirrored Websites mainly to provide pointers to new releases and information on how to get 
involved. (Where direct media outreach activities are deemed to be desirable, they could be pursued by a 
dedicated team of volunteers separate from the central operation.) 
WikiLeaks may yet restructure to embrace this alternative course of action, in the process healing some of 
the rifts which now threaten its long-term survival; to do so would also reduce the focus on Julian Assange 
which currently serves to undermine the organisation’s ability to operate more effectively. Whether Assange 
himself, who appears now to have become ever more synonymous with WikiLeaks itself, would consent to 
such a reorientation, however, remains to be seen. Perhaps more likely, by contrast, is the emergence of a 
range of more or less comparable alternative operators inspired by WikiLeaks’ early promise and continuing 
rhetoric. Such a development would once again mirror the trajectory of filesharing after the initial Napster 
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disruption: as music industry legal actions decapitated that particular hydra, many more filesharing platforms, 
services, and technologies sprang up in its stead, leading both to the development of Bittorrent technologies 
(which, notably, are today used just as much for the legitimate distribution of open source software and other 
sizeable digital packages as for the continuing unauthorised sharing of music, movies, and commercial 
software) and even to the eventual emergence of legal music download and streaming services from iTunes to 
Spotify.  
For whistleblowing, there remains a long road ahead until such a diverse ecosystem of platforms for the 
secure sharing of sensitive content in the public interest will emerge, and there is little guarantee that 
WikiLeaks will form part of it – Napster, certainly, exists as no more than a music industry-controlled zombie 
site in the current music filesharing ecology. In particular, it may seem unlikely today that ‘legal’ 
whistleblowing sites, sanctioned by government, are ever going to form a part of that ecosystem. However, at 
the same time, whistleblowing itself was once a widely condemned practice, while the legal codes of many 
nations today provide exceptions for whistleblowers whose leaks result in the uncovering of genuine political 
or commercial scandals, from Watergate to systematic tax evasion. In this context, it is especially interesting to 
note that the Parliament of Iceland, the Allþing, recently approved the Icelandic Modern Media Initiative 
(IMMI), which requires “the government to introduce a new legislative regime to protect and strengthen 
modern freedom of expression, and the free flow of information in Iceland and around the world”. The 
initiative responds directly to the global controversy around WikiLeaks, with WikiLeaks representatives 
reported to have been directly involved in developing the IMMI legislation; by passing it, Iceland is deliberately 
attempting to position itself as a safehaven for whistleblowers. 
Whether WikiLeaks itself is likely to be able to benefit from such support for its ideals remains to be seen; 
the decision on this is likely to be made not in the Allþing, but in Julian Assange’s inner circle. Whistleblowing 
itself, however, is as certain to continue as it is certain that there will continue to be misdeeds to blow the 
whistle on, whatever the risk and whatever the possible repercussions. In the long term, WikiLeaks’ greatest 
contribution to the process will not be the platform itself, but the further possibilities and potential which 
emerge from using advanced online tools for the secure sharing of sensitive information. 
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